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I.

INTRODUCTION

How should the legal system address conflicts that occur in very small
environments? The conflicts come in many kinds, including a nuisance
dispute between neighbors, an impending collision between two moving
vehicles, a joint decision between spouses about whether or on what terms to
continue their marriage, or a disagreement between managers and
shareholders within a firm.
The literature often refers to these small environments as “markets.”
Considering them in that way, however, averts our attention from larger
environments that should be included in the inquiry but that often do not
function well as private markets. The term “institutions” is better, because it
encompasses environments in which people have both market (exchangebased) and non-market interactions. Further, institutions are human
creations, while environments need not be.
One way to think of the problem is as “market fracture,” or the cost of
breaking the arenas in which people interact into excessively small pieces.
Focusing on the larger rather than the smaller arena can enable an increase
in social wealth or welfare but may also require greater state oversight. In the
process it may also require us to abandon the language of markets or
constrain its use, particularly in situations where instability (cycling) or
behavioral issues are prominent. In these settings the “market” is often little
more than an unhelpful metaphor.
People’s options often narrow as their commitment to a course of action
becomes deeper or more specific. One good example is marriage. While the
market for getting married is large and competitive, depending on the size of
the community, the market for divorce is a bilateral monopoly: you can get a
divorce only from the one you are with. This partly explains why most divorces
are more costly than most weddings. But if we assumed that the divorce rate
is excessive and something should be done about it, the fix might require state
intervention in the marriage market. That is, it may be preferable to fix this
problem earlier rather than later.
Alternatively, employers and prospective employees may bargain over
jobs in a competitive market. Post-hiring promotion or termination issues are
negotiated in a much smaller institution, however, which may also be a
bilateral monopoly in some cases.
Similarly, when a farmer in early spring makes a decision about what to
plant, the “market” she faces includes the full range of products she is capable
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of growing on her land and with her existing equipment. Once she has
planted beans, however, the market she faces is typically reduced to that
product, although it may be salable over a large geographic range. After the
beans have been delivered to a particular store, the market for them may
consist only of the subset of people who shop there. Each further stage in the
process fractures the market further and leaves people with a smaller range
of choices, provided that the costs of reversing the decision are greater than
the payoffs from switching.
To the extent reversal is costly, making a decision earlier saves more
resources than making it later. Indeed, the prospective farmer faces her
largest range of choices before she has settled on farming as a career at all. At
that time even her purchase of land and equipment is one of many options.
In addition, the decisions to enter farming, to grow beans in a particular year,
or to sell them to a particular store may have been mistakes. If so, they are
corrected more cheaply earlier rather than later.
In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase identified the costs of
bargaining as the main impediment to the free and efficient flow of
resources.1 As a result, Coase argued throughout his career that transaction
costs make a legal system important to social ordering.2 Coase wrote about
several common law disputes among neighbors whose economic activities
conflicted with one another. One of them was Sturges v. Bridgman, a 19thcentury British nuisance case between the two occupants of a duplex building
sharing a party wall.3 Octavius Sturges was a London pediatrician who
specialized in childrens’ respiratory diseases, such as pneumonia. Frederick
Horatio Bridgman was a confectioner to Queen Victoria, whose process for
making sweets required him to use a mechanical mortar and pestle to
pulverize substances such as chocolate.4 The nuisance dispute arose when
Sturges complained that Bridgman’s machine, with its repetitive pounding,
made it impossible for Sturges to use his stethoscope to diagnose patients.
Coase argued that if high transaction costs did not interfere, private
bargaining would provide a solution to the problem of conflicting uses, which
he characterized as “efficient.” By that he meant that the right to continue
would be given to the person who valued it most.5 For example, if the
pediatrician valued the right to relative silence at £100, while the confectioner
valued the right to conduct his business at £60, the efficient solution would
preserve the pediatrician’s £100 value over the confectioner’s £60 value. If no

1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
2. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Professor, Univ. Chi. Law Sch., The Institutional Structure of
Production, Prize Lecture for the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (Dec. 9,
1991), in 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1992).
3. See generally Sturges v. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch.D. 852 (1879).
4. For more on the players and the facts in Sturges v. Bridgman, see generally A.W. Brian
Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 54–58 (1996).
5. Coase, supra note 1, at 16.
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one else was affected, then this outcome made society as a whole wealthier as
well.
Alternative solutions might preserve the ability of both parties to operate,
however, generating a social value of £160. Coase did not consider these,
because the tiny market he considered was too small to include them. He was
concerned with transaction costs, and on his assumptions the only parties who
could transact were Sturges and Bridgman. This tiny microcosm was the
appropriate institution for analysis because Sturges and Bridgman were
locked together by virtue of their own previous investments. Stepping back to
an earlier point in time and considering a broader range of alternatives was
not economically feasible if the payoff to extraction was less than the payoff
to staying inside their tiny market and reaching an agreement.
The greater benefit from stepping back does not result from eliminating
or internalizing an externality. The problem is not that looking at the smaller
environment ignores an uncompensated injury that one person imposes on
another, but rather that the larger environment prevents certain injuries from
arising in the first place. Neither does it have anything to do with transaction
costs: the parties might be able to bargain costlessly to a maximizing solution
within their current environment but would still be unable to achieve the
gains that the larger environment permits.
These costs of reversal are sometimes transaction costs, but often they are
simply a cost of moving resources. For example, the farmer who realizes too
late that planting beans was a mistake may have to plow up the bean field,
prepare the soil a second time, and plant spinach or some other crop.
Assuming she does the work herself, however, most of these costs would not
be costs of transacting, although some transactions, such as the purchase of
substitute seed, could be involved as well.
Transaction costs in one’s current setting are only a portion of the costs
of locating the best place for resources. Considering all relevant costs usually
requires us to focus on larger institutions and longer time periods than the
fractured markets that inhabit Coase.
A good counterexample to Sturges and Bridgman is the law and
economics of automobile accidents, where assumptions about the high costs
of bargaining have turned attention to the overall markets where automobiles
operate rather than individual pairwise arrangements. When we refocus our
attention in this way, the results that Coase described as efficient are
frequently suboptimal. In fact, as developed below, the practical inability of
rapidly moving motor vehicles to negotiate with each other over who should
yield has forced decision makers to step back and consider the larger setting
in which these decisions are made. As a result, outcomes in cases involving
traffic rules are inherently superior to outcomes in cases involving nuisance
disputes between neighbors.6
6.

See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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One important source of social savings is determining where resources
should be assigned initially, thus limiting the occasions and costs for further
movement. Discovering that planting beans or marrying a particular partner
is a mistake is best made before planting or marrying. Further, these costs of
waiting are higher as initial resource investment is less coordinated, more
costly, or more specialized as to activity and location. Determining the initial
location of resources often requires us to consider the interests of larger
numbers of players, however, encompassing a larger institution in which
resources move around. Markets like those envisioned in The Problem of Social
Cost, which move resources only by unanimous consent, work more poorly as
the number of participants increases.7 Coase himself realized that in such
cases government intervention may be preferable even for relatively simple
conflicts traditionally analyzed under the common law of nuisance or trespass.
Finally, as the next section develops, when we consider the full range of
relevant decisions only a small portion of the costs to be considered are
“transaction” costs.
II. THE COSTS OF RESOURCE MOVEMENT
Moving things from one place to another is costly. I may have a second
television that would be of better use in my son’s apartment, because he has
none. If he values it more than I do, moving it might be a good idea. But I live
in Iowa City, while he is in New York. Moving the television to New York might
cost $150, and he could buy a good used one or perhaps a small new one in
New York for less. In that case moving the television actually decreases its net
value even though he values my television more than I do.
Most people spend substantial time considering the costs of moving
resources around. We make decisions about where to live in relation to work,
where to go on vacation, where to shop and how to organize a multi-store trip,
or whether to shop in person or online. The best course of action is usually to
get our plan right the first time, for fixing it later costs more. The relevant
costs can range from relatively small, as in a poorly organized grocery list, to
quite large, in the case of a bad choice of a location for one’s home or
business, or marriage partner.
Traditionally, economics paid surprisingly little attention to the cost of
moving resources. Nobel laureate Douglass North once complained that
neoclassical economics avoided “all of the interesting questions,” because
“[t]he world with which [economics] is concerned is a frictionless one in
which institutions do not exist and all change occurs through perfectly
operating markets. In short, the costs of acquiring information, uncertainty,
and transactions costs do not exist.”8

7.
8.

See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 5 (1981); see also
MARTIN HOLLIS & EDWARD J. NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF
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In economic models, resources often move without friction from lowervalue to higher-value positions until the economy is in equilibrium, or a steady
state in which no further gains from resource movement are possible. One
important economist who took exception to this was Cambridge economist
Arthur Cecil Pigou. Writing in the 1920s and 1930s, he was deeply concerned
about the costs of moving resources.9 Prior to the time of Coase, however,
Pigou was somewhat at odds with his discipline.
Coase’s work turned people’s attention to “transaction costs,” particularly
to his theory that the cost of reaching a suitable private agreement is what
accounts for the legal system. Transaction costs are only a subset of the costs
of moving resources, however, and often a fairly small subset. If I loaded my
TV into my van and drove it to New York, getting it there would be costly.
These would not be “transaction costs,” however, except for purchases of
gasoline, tolls, and perhaps a motel room along the way. Indeed, Coase
argued in his well-known 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm, that minimization
of all kinds of costs, including transaction costs, determines which things a
firm will do for itself internally and which it will purchase on a market.10 For
example, cleaning the office windows could be done by the firm’s own
employees or else by contracting with a window washing service. When it
makes this decision, the firm really does not care that one of these is a
“transaction” cost while the other is not. The only thing that matters is which
costs less.
The term “transaction costs” is overused in law and economics,
particularly when it is applied to costs unrelated to transactions. For me to
wash my own windows is costly, but using my own labor is not a transaction
cost. Often nontransaction costs are wrapped up into a bargain in such a way
that they disguise the deal’s nontransactional components. For example, if I
am an apple grower selling to a retailer 50 miles away, my crop of apples will
need to be shipped. Shipping could clearly be part of our negotiated
transaction. Shipping in this case is not a “transaction” cost, but rather a cost
of resource movement. If I grew my apples in one place and owned a fruit
stand 50 miles away, I would still have to ship them, even though no
transactions are necessarily involved. I might load them onto my own truck
and drive them to the fruit stand myself. Whether or not I “transact,” the
apples must still be moved. Indeed, if I purchased transportation services in a
competitive market, only a small part of the price would reflect transaction
costs; the rest would cover the physical cost of getting my apples from one
place to another.
NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 233–37 (1975) (arguing that the neo-classical “assumption of easy,
costless transfer of resources is nonsensical”); Charles K. Rowley, Rent-Seeking Versus Directly
Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 15, 18 (Charles
K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988) (describing neo-classical economists’ views on transfers).
9. See infra notes 13–20 and accompanying text.
10. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).

HOVENKAMP_PP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/15/2014 3:30 PM

FRACTURED MARKETS AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

623

Coase observed that if the costs of transacting were greater than the
increase in value that resulted from a transfer, then the transaction would not
occur. He began with the traditional economic observation that resources
under free choice move from lower to higher value uses. But then he added
the important qualifier that “this assumed costless market transactions.”11
Further,
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into
account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be
undertaken when the increase in the value of production
consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which
would be involved in bringing it about. When it is less, the granting
of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the
liability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued
(or may prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if
market transactions were costless. In these conditions the initial
delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with
which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights
may bring about a greater value of production than any other. But
unless this is the arrangement of rights established by the legal
system, the costs of reaching the same result by altering and
combining rights through the market may be so great that this
optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production
which it would bring, may never be achieved.12
Pigou had made exactly the same point three decades earlier, but he spoke
more globally of the “costs of movement,” which encompassed all the costs of
getting a resource from one use to another:
Suppose that between two points A and B the movement of a unit of
resources can be effected at a capital cost equivalent to an annual
charge of n shillings for every year during which a unit that is moved
continues in productive work in its new home. In these
circumstances the national dividend will be increased by the
movement of resources from A to B, so long as the annual value of
the marginal social net product at B exceeds that at A by more than
n shillings . . . .13

11. Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
12. Id. at 15–16. See generally Coase, supra note 2.
13. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 138 (4th ed. 1962). Pigou used the term
“national dividend” to mean aggregate social income—specifically, “the national dividend is that
part of the objective income of the community, including, of course, income derived from
abroad, which can be measured in money.” Id. at 31; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and
the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71–72 (2012) (explaining how antitrust policy can
relate to the costs of resource movement other than transaction costs); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 504 (2011) (noting
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Many of the things that Pigou included as costs of movement were ones
that Coase later characterized as transaction costs.14 In addition, however,
were many other costs, including lack of information and education,15
transportation,16 and commuting distances and time for workers.17 He also
included some costs that today might be characterized as behavioral, such as
imperfect knowledge, noting that imperfect knowledge might cause people
either to exaggerate or understate the costs of moving a resource.18 Pigou
observed that reducing these costs of movement enabled a division of labor,
resulting in cheaper or better quality goods.19 For example, Pigou noted that
machine production reduced the demand for skilled labor, and that unskilled
laborers could generally be redeployed at lower cost than skilled workers, thus
enabling workers to be shifted more cheaply as product needs changed.20
A. RELATIVE DEADWEIGHT LOSS
The costs of movement in general, or transaction costs in particular, are
sometimes described as an economic “dead-weight loss.”21 That conclusion is
not useful for policy purposes, however, unless we ask “compared to what?”
For example, we speak of the deadweight loss of monopoly only by comparing
it to a competitive economy, or else to some alternative market thought to be

that “[p]rior to Pigou . . . the marginalists largely ignored the cost of moving resources”); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 637–38 (2009)
(discussing Pigou’s contributions to the Coasian theory of transaction costs); cf. Harold Demsetz,
The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem?: A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2011) (acknowledging the differences between transaction and other
resource movement costs); Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1471, 1483–93 (2013) (using the term “resource allocation” to describe movement costs).
14. E.g., PIGOU, supra note 13, at 158:
[P]ayments that have to be made to various agents in the capital market, promoters,
financing syndicates, investment trusts, solicitors, bankers, and others, who, in
varying degrees according to the nature of the investment concerned, help in the
work of transporting capital from its places of origin to its places of employment.
15. See id. at 149–57 (discussing the impact of imperfect knowledge on the movement of
resources).
16. See id. at 290–317 (discussing the effects of railroad rate structure on the movement of
resources).
17. See id. at 482–84.
18. Id. at 144–45.
19. Id. at 488–518.
20. Id. at 488–511.
21. Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 577, 579
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frieder Frasch, Transaction Costs of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme in German Companies, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 48, 48 (2007)
(“[A]ll transaction costs are ‘deadweight losses.’”); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer
Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1683 (2006)
(explaining the objectionable nature of transaction costs as “deadweight losses that reduce
efficiency”).
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more competitive.22 By contrast, if we are speaking of social gains from
innovation, then there is ample support for the position that the monopolist
produces greater value than a group of competitive firms, so the net
deadweight loss from monopoly may actually be negative.23
If the baseline is a frictionless economy in which everything moves
costlessly from one use to another, then any cost of movement is a deadweight
loss. But no one inhabits such an economy. A more useful definition is that a
cost of moving a resource is a deadweight loss to the extent that it is more
costly than equally good and available alternatives. Ceteris paribus, going from
more to less costly means of moving resources, will generally produce net
gains, provided that nonparties are not adversely affected. An important
corollary is that a search for greater efficiency, assuming that is our goal,
requires us continuously to seek out lower costs of moving resources around
and—equally important—mechanisms for getting them into the right place
to begin with.
B. THE CHOICE OF AN INITIAL POSITION AND THE VALUE OF PLANNING
Another important corollary, stressed by Pigou and later by Calabresi, but
not by Coase, is that placing resources initially in their highest value use is
efficient to the extent it makes further movement unnecessary.24 It does not
matter whether these costs of movement are transactional or
nontransactional. For example, Pigou was particularly concerned about the
extent to which workers were often initially assigned to low-value occupations,
largely because of family tradition or lack of education.25
In Coase’s conception, efficiency is undermined by externalities whose
costs cannot be internalized because transaction costs are too high. For
example, the noise of Bridgman’s mortar and pestle imposes a negative
externality on Sturges. This is a resource conflict the parties can address by
bargaining. If the legal system assigns the right to the wrong person, however,

22.

See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
19–20 (4th ed. 2011).
23. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 9–10 (2012).
24. See PIGOU, supra note 13, at 138.
25. Pigou explained this problem as a result of ignorance:
AND ITS PRACTICE

The most fundamental way in which the first of these causes, ignorance, operates is
by impairing the initial distribution of new generations of workpeople as they flow
into industry. Those persons who direct the choice of avocations made by young
men and women entering industry are ignorant both of the level at which the
demand price for any given quantity of labour of any given grade will stand in
different occupations at a later period of those young persons’ lives, and also of what
the quantity of labour offering itself in those different occupations at that period
will be.
Id. at 492. On the problem today, see generally Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, Improving Efficiency in
School Choice, in THE HANDBOOK OF MARKET DESIGN 170 (Nir Vulkan et al. eds., 2013).
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high transaction costs may prevent it from being transferred to the correct
one.
But suppose that upon first entering the confection trade, Bridgman
could have chosen between two equally suitable buildings that cost the same.
He chose the one that later created the conflict with Sturges. The other
building would be occupied by a different noise-making business that would
not have been bothered by Bridgman’s mortar and pestle—say, an implement
sharpener. Once the decision creating the conflict is made, relocating to the
alternative place would cost £25, but initially it would have cost Bridgman the
same amount to move into either location, so the net cost would be zero. This
lost £25 shows up now to the extent that reciprocal bargaining obliges either
Bridgman or Sturges to pay it, depending on how the law assigns liability. For
example, if the law finds against Sturges, holding that there is no nuisance,
then Sturges must pay Bridgman at least £25 to get him to move. By contrast,
if Bridgman had moved into the correct place to begin with, neither would
have to pay and society would be £25 richer.
Of course, if resources moved without friction or other cost, then
Bridgman’s initial choice would not have made any difference. Planning
would be unimportant because any mistake could be costlessly reversed. In
the world we live in, however, getting the first decision right is an essential
element in efficiency. Or, to state it more generally: long-range planning
becomes more important as all of the costs of movement, both transactional
and nontransactional, are higher and more costly to reverse. To that extent,
planning enables society to avoid the cost of market fracture.
The law and economics of traffic accidents takes a very different
approach to this problem. It considers the full market in which automobiles
operate rather than the relationship, or market, that exists between a pair of
automobiles approaching one another.26 For example, the American rule
requiring driving on the right side of the road, or the uniform state-imposed
rule that automobiles must yield to trains at grade crossings, perform the same
function: they ensure that operators need not engage in pairwise bargaining
just before a collision is about to occur. These are basically “zoning” rules for
the road, which rely on conventions or cost avoidance as a surrogate for
bargaining. Their goal is to get people into the right place from the
beginning, so that subsequent bargaining will not be necessary. The premise
for state-enforced traffic rules is that greater government intervention is
needed because individual bargaining is less likely to be effective. When all
the relevant costs of land-use externalities are considered, however, including
the cost of not being in the right place from the beginning, the differences
between traffic rules and zoning rules become relatively insignificant.
Common law nuisance rules, such as those in Sturges v. Bridgman, take the

26. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

HOVENKAMP_PP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/15/2014 3:30 PM

FRACTURED MARKETS AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

627

parties where they are already located. By contrast, zoning rules prevent them
from moving into conflict-producing situations in the first place.
III. COASEAN MARKETS
Those who read Coase have seen a variety of things, many of which Coase
himself did not see or would likely have rejected. Nevertheless, the institutions
that are central to the functioning of the legal system in Coase’s analysis have
some distinctive features. One is Coase’s very narrow conception of
“efficiency” or social savings.27 A second is that the markets that occupy his
analysis are typically very small. How small they are is determined by the costs
of movement, both transactional and nontransactional, from a given starting
position.28 A third feature of Coasean markets is that moving resources within
them requires unanimous agreement of the relevant participants. As Coase
himself acknowledged more than once, this fact has important implications
for the efficacy of bargained solutions as the number of individuals bargaining
increases.29
A. IDENTIFYING THE EFFICIENT OUTCOME
Traditional competitive markets typically have large numbers of buyers
and sellers, but a single buyer and a single seller are sufficient to make a trade.
For example, if I buy a loaf of bread from my grocer, both the grocer and I
are better off. The market for bread contains many other buyers and sellers
who did not participate in this transaction. They are largely indifferent to my
particular deal, except to the extent that one or more of them had been
competing for my trade, or that I took the last loaf on the shelf. In some cases
others will use information about my trade to inform their own choices. They
will go on to make their trades with others. While a particular transaction
occurs at the “micro” level, the overall market could be very large, perhaps
even nationwide or worldwide.
These traditional markets are not the ones contemplated in The Problem
of Social Cost. There, the trade and the market are the same size. Think back
to Sturges v. Bridgman, which Coase used to illustrate how private bargaining
could resolve the dispute without the intervention of the legal system. Rather
than thinking of one party as a victim of a wrongdoer’s negative externality,
Coase argued, we should treat each as having a tradable property interest that
conflicts with the interest of the other. They are like two people vying to park
their cars in the same spot. Assuming that they bargain, the winner will be the
person who places the higher value on the right. Suppose Sturges values the
right to be free of the noise by £100, while Bridgman values the right to use
his noisy machine by £60. Suppose also that the law said Sturges would lose

27.
28.
29.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
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his lawsuit because the operation of the mortar and pestle is not a nuisance.
Sturges would pay Bridgman a sum between £60 and £100, Bridgman would
shut down the machine, and both parties would be better off. For example, if
Sturges paid Bridgman £75, Bridgman would be £15 better off and Sturges
would be £25 better off. Suppose, however, that the law of London provided
that the machine was a nuisance, entitling Sturges to an injunction shutting it
down. Bridgman might wish to settle with a money payment, but the most he
would pay is £60 and the least Sturges would accept is £100. No settlement
would occur and the injunction would shut the machine down.
This story illustrates both the “invariance” corollary and the “efficiency”
corollary of the Coase Theorem.30 The invariance corollary is somewhat
counterintuitive and its domain has been controversial, particularly where the
participants are not risk neutral.31 The decision whether Bridgman’s mortar
and pestle continues to operate is not determined by whether it is an unlawful
nuisance, but rather by the respective values that the two parties place on the
right in question. In its strongest form, the theorem states that in the absence
of transaction costs, common law rules have nothing whatsoever to do with
how resources are allocated, although they may force some money to change
hands. In the nuisance jurisdiction the mortar and pestle is shut down and
neither party pays anything to the other. In the no-nuisance jurisdiction the
mortar and pestle is also shut down, but this time physician Sturges pays
Bridgman between £60 and £100 to shut down.
In order for the invariance thesis to apply the rights in question must be
“alienable,” which means that they can be traded through private settlement
of a lawsuit.32 Common law rights are generally alienable in this fashion.
However, many statutory rights or public regulations are not. For example,
even if a noisy machine produced larger gains to its owners than harm to
others, neighbors would not be able to negotiate around a zoning statute that
forbade it. A neighbor typically has no right to “waive” his neighbor’s
obligations under the zoning laws.
The efficiency corollary of the Coase Theorem states that in a wellfunctioning market the outcome will be “efficient,” which means that it
maximizes the wealth of the two parties and thus social wealth, assuming that
no one else is affected. The Coasean bargain assigns the disputed interest to
30. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101–06 (2004).
31. Under declining marginal utility or an “endowment” effect, the invariance corollary may
not hold true, at least not for human actors or firms that are not risk neutral. See generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (1990); Daniel
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1325 (1990). For additional analysis, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (noting that the endowment effect is “the principal
that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not”).
32. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972).
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the person who values it most highly. In the given example, the physician’s
right to be free of the noise is worth £100, while the confectioner’s right to
create the noise is worth only £60. Forcibly granting the right to the
confectioner would destroy £100 in resources in favor of a value of only £60.
Thus the “efficient” outcome is defined as the one that produces the £100
right.
Describing this as the “efficient” outcome is myopic, however, in one
critical sense. We must ask, “Compared to what?” Clearly an even more
efficient outcome would be one where both Sturges and Bridgman could
conduct their business without interference from the other. This would
generate total value of £160. Coase did not consider this a viable alternative
because he took the location of Sturges and Bridgman in the same building
as a given. The fractured market in which he analyzed the conflict was one in
which Sturges and Bridgman faced only each other.
Society’s ability to attain the £160 by looking at the longer run has
nothing to do with either externalities or transaction costs in the micromarket
that Sturges and Bridgman occupy. Efficiency queries typically look at the
wealth created (or destroyed) in the market at hand. Harms imposed on
others are externalities to the extent that they are not settled by bargaining
or imposition of the correct legal rule. But stepping back and looking at a
larger setting often permits superior solutions if extraction is costly. In a larger
environment this particular externality may not have come into existence in
the first place.
B. MICROMARKETS: FUNCTIONALITY AND FRACTURE
Coase focused the economic analysis of law on “micromarkets,” or
situations involving very small groups of traders who are locked together by
some preexisting commitment, whether it be tenants sharing a duplex,
neighbors in a subdivision, two automobiles speeding toward one another, an
unhappy marriage, or disputes between shareholders and managers in a
single corporation.33
One problem with these Coasean markets is that they are rarely very
competitive. Sturges and Bridgman have only each other to bargain with, and
bilateral monopolies of this sort often lead to difficulty in reaching outcomes.
They can generate high transaction costs because there is no competition to
discipline each person’s ask or offer prices. Joint maximization may be
frustrated by each person’s incentive to hide information from the other.34

33. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) (discussing
the application of the Coase Theorem in family law, torts, corporations and other business
associations, and financial markets).
34. See generally Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J.
831 (1989). On bilateral monopoly and the Coase Theorem, see generally Robert Cooter, The Cost
of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). Among the earliest observations of indeterminacy in strictly
bilateral trading is FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE
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These problems are exacerbated as Coasean markets have larger numbers of
actors because unanimity is a precondition to trading. Such markets are not
“bilateral” monopolies. Nevertheless, they have all the efficiency-challenging
characteristics of bilateral monopolies, except magnified.35
London in 1879 undoubtedly had hundreds of physicians, hundreds of
confectioners, and thousands of duplexes or other buildings suitable for
business. When we ordinarily talk about markets we would think of this range
of providers. Physicians compete with each other, as do confectioners and
landlords, and new ones continuously enter the trade. But the “market” at
issue in Coase’s article was a peculiar one, limited to a single physician, a
single confectioner, and a single building. This is so mainly because the size
of the market under contemplation depends heavily on the time at which we
view it.
What makes the relationship between solitary Sturges, solitary Bridgman,
and their solitary duplex a “market”? The answer is that prior commitments
plus the costs of movement define this market’s boundaries. Sturges and
Bridgman are stuck together by virtue of a previous investment each of them
had made in the same building and that later turns out to be mistaken.36 As a
result, neither competition with other confectioners or physicians nor the
possibility of new entry is relevant. For example, suppose as before that
Sturges valued the right to be free of Bridgman’s noise at £100, while
Bridgman valued use of the mortar and pestle in his business at £60. But
suppose that for £35 Bridgman could move to an equally good location with
no noise or other conflict and no harm to his business. No matter how liability
was assigned, Bridgman would move. In a nuisance jurisdiction he would
move rather than shut down. In a no nuisance jurisdiction Sturges would pay
him to move, which would require less than paying him to shut down. If
Bridgman had moved to a location with no conflict to begin with, however,
his moving costs would be zero.
Coase had actually recognized this in 1937, in The Nature of the Firm.37 A
profit-maximizing firm would compare the cost of all available alternatives for
getting something accomplished, choosing the value maximizing solution.38
The message of Coase’s 1937 article is that when we consider the problem of
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 29–33 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers
1967) (1881). See generally Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and
Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 101 (1960).
35. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
36. Compare this with “lock in” as a theory justifying very small markets in antitrust cases.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, at 103–04. For example, those who already own a Kodak photocopier
are locked in to an ongoing supply of service and repair parts, thus making “Kodak parts” or
“Kodak service” a relevant market to them. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 458–59 (1992) (accepting this theory); 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 564b (4th ed. 2013) (critiquing the Eastman Kodak decision).
37. See Coase, supra note 10.
38. Id. at 394–95.
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Sturges and Bridgman, focusing exclusively on transaction costs and on the
micromarket that their dispute created can lead us astray. Rather, we should
consider all of the costs of moving resources, including transaction costs, as
well as the full range of places and times where movement can occur. The
differences can be important. Coase’s approach in The Nature of the Firm
compared the cost of transacting against the cost of getting something done
by any other means, not limited to transactions. By transacting, a firm would
shift activity outside of the firm. By not transacting it would perform that
activity inside. For those purposes, the cost of redeploying resources initially
invested badly would also be a cost. The “cheapest cost avoider” gets it right
the first time.
By focusing exclusively on transaction costs from a position defined by
previous investment, Coasean thinking shifted our attention to the fractured
micromarkets in which disputes arise in the short run. Previous choices bind
the two actors together, and extraction is costly. But suppose that we had been
able to steer either Sturges or Bridgman to a different location to begin with,
a policy that Pigou advocated strenuously.39 In that case the cost of movement
could have been even lower, certainly less than the cost of moving to one
address and then relocating to another. The truly efficient solution to Sturges
v. Bridgman is the one that permits each of them to operate without
interference by the other. Further, the most efficient version of that choice is
likely to be one that defines their property interests in such a way that they
never become neighbors in the first place.
In an example that Coase used frequently, once a polluting smokestack
and a residential neighborhood are constructed and in place, bargaining
assigns the right to the higher value participants.40 But an even higher value
could be obtained if a zoning law forbade smokestacks and homes from
locating in close proximity to begin with—or perhaps if the parties had the
foresight to see into the future and bargain about location before making any
initial investment. The Coasean reasoning forces us to think of the “market”
as the relationship between neighbors whose uses are already in place, in the
process ignoring a larger market that presented a greater array of choices.
C. THE COUNTEREXAMPLE OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
The law and economics of automobile accidents went in a different
direction from nuisance law, largely because actual transacting was such an
unpromising solution. In the first law review article to cite The Problem of Social
Cost, Walter Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., from the University of Chicago, noted
the importance of Coase’s work in assessing resource conflict.41 They

39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. Coase, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–13.
41. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem—Auto
Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 699–700 (1964).
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concluded that it could not be applied to automobile accidents, however.42 In
traffic collision cases people do not know in advance who their bargaining
opposites are until it is too late, and there are other significant limitations to
their ability to bargain over such issues as the right of way.43
Guido Calabresi responded that the way to think about the problem is to
imagine who would have won the bargain in a regime in which bargaining had
been possible. Under bargaining in a well-functioning market, the person
who ends up taking the precaution is the one in a position to avoid the
accident at the lowest cost. Thus the “cheapest cost avoider” entered the
lexicon of law and economics.44 As Calabresi observed, a “pure market”
approach to the problem of minimizing accident costs would be to “allocate
the costs to those acts or activities that an arbitrary initial bearer of accident
costs would (in the absence of transaction and information costs) find it most
worthwhile to ‘bribe’ in order to obtain that modification of behavior which
would lessen accident costs most.”45
While Calabresi was responding to a problem of extremely high
transaction costs, his solution to the traffic accident problem is not about
transaction costs at all, but about the generally nontransactional costs of
movement. For example, consider the common law rule adopted by the
Supreme Court and apparently every state that, at grade level railroad
crossings, trains have the right of way over wagons, cars, or other vehicles who
cross the tracks. Nineteenth century courts at all levels derived the rule from
the “character and momentum” of the train as opposed to a wagon or
automobile:
From the character and momentum of a railroad train, and the
requirements of public travel by means thereof, it cannot be
expected that it shall stop and give precedence to an approaching

42. Id. at 700.
43. Id. See generally Steven G. Medema, Rethinking Market Failure: ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
Before the ‘Coase Theorem’ (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2188728 (exploring Coase’s early influence).
44. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 135 & n.1. Calabresi observed that these costs were not
transaction costs at all, but rather alternatives, or substitutes, for transacting. See Guido Calabresi
& Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–61 n.20
(1972); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11
J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968). Coase had also observed in relation to pairwise bargaining that when
transaction costs are high, the legal system should assign the right initially to the person who
placed the highest value on it. Coase, supra note 1, at 15–17.
45. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 135. The first edition of Richard A. Posner’s Economic
Analysis of Law expressed the same idea in terms of mimicking the market. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18 (1st ed. 1972) (“Transaction costs are minimized when the law
(1) assigns the right to the party who would buy it from the other party if it were assigned to the
other party instead and if transaction costs were zero, or (2) alternatively, places liability on the
party who, if he had the right and transaction costs were zero, would sell it to the other party.”
(emphasis omitted)).
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wagon to make the crossing first: it is the duty of the wagon to wait
for the train.46
The rationale is fairly simple: it costs a great deal more to stop and restart
a train than to stop and restart a car. If the train would incur costs of $2.00
while the car would incur costs of 20 cents, then the parties would bargain for
an outcome in which the train would have the right of way. If payment were
necessary, the amount would be somewhere between 20 cents and $2.00.
While this problem can be recast as one in transaction costs, it is not a
transaction cost problem at all, but one related to the mechanical and energy
costs of stopping and restarting heavier versus lighter or faster versus slower
vehicles. Indeed, the fact that the problem relates to engineering or
mechanical costs rather than bargaining costs is what permits us to generalize
across the full range of similar conflicts. We can address the problem on a
“class” basis, or legislatively, rather than by assessing individual pairwise
conflicts. Thinking of the problem as one in bargaining may be an interesting
metaphor, but it does not add anything to the solution. It indicates only the
truism that the costs of movement that require a bargain are always at least as
great as the costs of movement alone. If we required a transaction, then the
higher total costs of reaching the right result would make the good outcome
less certain, but that is only because we have added the complexity of an
unnecessary bargain.
One important difference between transaction costs and
nontransactional costs of movement is that the latter typically relate to
engineering, transportation, or sometimes social convention (such as driving
on the right side of the road). These are all processes that are capable of
evaluation by outside observers. By contrast, transaction costs depend on
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept—numbers that are subjective and
much more difficult to observe, particularly if we are talking about natural
persons rather than business firms. When we think about good traffic rules,
casting the problem in terms of one person’s willingness-to-pay and another’s
willingness-to-accept overly subjectifies what is fundamentally a problem in
risk management. For example, a civil engineer’s observations about
appropriate rules for trains and cars at grade crossings gives us much better

46. Cont’l Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U.S. 161, 164 (1877); accord Grand Trunk Ry. Co.
of Can. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 431 (1892) (noting that a person “approaching a railroad crossing,
ought to make a vigilant use of his senses of sight and hearing, in order to avoid a collision”);
Brown v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 7 So. 682, 683 (La. 1890) (commending the district court judge for
applying the Continental Improvement Co. rule); Del Buono v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 124 So. 694, 696
(La. Ct. App. 1929) (discussing the “superior right of the train”). The Supreme Court’s
“character and momentum” statement was used in state court jury instructions on duty to yield.
See, e.g., Kan. City, M. & O. Ry. Co. v. McDaniel, 165 P. 1144, 1144 (Okla. 1917) (considering a
collision between a train and a wagon); Brogdon v. Nw. R.R. Co. of S.C., 139 S.E. 459, 462 (S.C.
1927) (considering a collision between a train and an automobile).
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and more useful information than any notion about the states of mind or the
bargaining strategies of the operators.
D. KEEPING CONTRACT AND BEHAVIORAL EXPECTATIONS WITHIN APPROPRIATE
BOUNDS
Ronald Coase’s work served to establish a strong link between contract
rights and private legal disputes. Every resource conflict becomes a bargaining
problem. When we think of legal conflicts in terms of the cost of moving
resources rather than simply the costs of bargaining, however, the link
between contract bargaining and outcomes in the legal system becomes
weaker. This is not to say that bargaining or the right to bargain is not
important. In many situations the legal system does and should defer to
parties’ contractual judgments rather than the objectively defined costs of
moving resources. Buyers and sellers in competitive markets make highly
individual choices about with whom to transact, what to buy, and how much
to pay. People who are of age have a right to select each other for marriage,
even if friends believe that this particular resource movement is a bad idea
and may lead to costly redeployment in the future.
But imagining bargains in situations where they are unnecessary, as the
Coasean analysis sometimes does, may force people to identify particular
solutions as desirable even though more satisfactory solutions are available.
On the illustrative numbers given previously, the “efficient” solution to Sturges
v. Bridgman is for Bridgman to shut down his mortar and pestle, thus
preserving Sturges’s more valuable interest. This solution is seen as efficient
only because we are viewing it myopically, however, within the context of a
micromarket that the parties’ own prior decisions had created. Once we look
at the bigger market where the services of physicians and confectioners are
sold, then solutions emerge in which both Sturges and Bridgman can
continue to operate. While stepping back provides opportunity for resources
savings, however, it also opens up the universe of potential bargainers and
makes actual bargaining much less likely. Theoretically, everyone in or about
to go to London could bargain over the best location for each.
But now the bargain begins to resemble a social contract rather than a
real, executed contract. The peculiarity of social contracts is that, whatever
their strengths as justifications for social ordering, they cannot possibly be the
products of actual bargains involving all interested participants. The bargains
have to be “reconstructed” through the making of more external judgments
about who profits, by how much, what we should presume about participants’
attitudes about risk, and so on.47

47. For examples from diverse ideologies, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 110–12 (1985) (defending the classical
liberal version of the Takings Clause); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 20, 370 (2014) (defending
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Written on a smaller scale, this observation extends to a wide variety of
circumstances, such as the proverbial smokestack industry and the downwind
homeowners. Once affected parties with opposing interests have invested in
their position, they become the entire market for bargaining purposes. The
efficient solution will impose considerable costs on at least one group. But
earlier, before their positions have been established, a range of more
attractive solutions is available that can limit or eliminate the damage to all.
Perhaps for this reason, more than a half-century of Coasean analysis has not
placed a noticeable dent in the prevalence of basic zoning rules that segregate
polluting industry from residential uses. When we think about the initial
assignment in such settings, pairwise bargaining is not the best way to allocate
land uses.
When we examine the cost of traffic collisions and the cheapest way of
avoiding them, the imaginary bargain that we use to identify who would have
won the right of way is only a “bargain” in a metaphorical sense. Ultimately,
these questions reduce to ones of engineering, technical ability or superiority,
or some other factor that has nothing to do with a bargain. Deciding whether
the train or the car should yield the right of way is fundamentally not a
problem in bargaining. Making it into one involves many behavioral and
transactional complexities, while giving nothing in return.
Such solutions do limit property and contract rights to the extent that
they forbid individuals from creating harmful externalities in the first place.
Perhaps land occupants should have a property right or liberty of contract to
invest in any activity and resolve externality issues later by making or imposing
costly divestments. Or perhaps automobile drivers should have a right to drive
on whichever side of the road they please, bargaining to yield whenever traffic
approaches. To be sure, drivers do not own the roads and consent to traffic
rules are a price of admission. But that answer is incomplete. One can say the
same thing about property rights generally: someone has a right to own
property but not a right to use it to harm others. One characteristic of most
externalities is that they have no respect for property lines, whether it is
Bridgman’s noisy machine or the polluter’s smoke. Accepting the Coasean
analysis, however, entails that we have already subordinated these liberty
rights to concerns about efficiency.
Nontransactional costs of movement can more easily be predicted across
categories of persons because our thinking is not complicated by the need to
consider hypothetical bargains. For example, the emergent field of behavioral
economics is complex, often indeterminate, and difficult for courts to apply.48
But behavioral economics, like all other economics, is fundamentally about

the classical liberal version of the social contract); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev.
ed.1999) (arguing that society has entered into a hypothetical social contract).
48. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
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bargaining. Often the best way to avoid these issues of indeterminacy is to
avoid bargaining metaphors altogether.
The domain and usefulness of behavioral law and economics are
currently up for grabs.49 One thing that is clear, however, is that incorporating
behaviorist assumptions into economics makes transaction analysis both more
complex and less robust. An important way to limit the complexities that
behavioral economics imposes is to limit the situations in which bargaining
metaphors are required. Coase largely ignored these issues, even as he insisted
that the problem be cast as one of bargaining. A much more direct route to
the same result is to ignore bargaining altogether in situations where
bargaining is unnecessary or where bargaining metaphors are unhelpful.
IV. COASEAN MARKETS WITH MANY PLAYERS
Economics often encounters markets with many players. Outcomes vary
with assumptions. For example, the First Welfare Theorem (perfect
competition) is relatively easy to prove, while strict proof of the Coase
Theorem is very difficult. The reason is that all actors in the perfectly
competitive market are powerless and strategic behavior is impossible. If the
market price is P, a prospective seller can either sell or not sell, and a
prospective buyer can either buy or not buy. The seller invariably sells if its
willingness-to-accept (“WTA”) is less then P, and the buyer invariably buys if
her willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) is greater than P.50 That is, there is no room
for strategic behavior. In the Coasean situation, by contrast, the price is
indeterminate, and one cannot conclude that a trade will be made any time
it is jointly profitable, and certainly not in the case of three or more players.
As a result, the proof requires significantly stronger, and perhaps more
idiosyncratic, rationality assumptions.51 If there are three or more

49. For divergent views, see generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014) (analyzing retirement savings,
consumer credit, and environmental protections to illustrate behavioral law and economics);
Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics of Repeated
Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (2005) (discussing how the probability of costs and benefits
associated with a particular choice can be addressed in the legal context); Russell Korobkin,
Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to
the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523 (2014) (describing the benefits and costs of
implementing relative value health insurance); Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for
Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653 (suggesting that theorists turn their
attention to the value of autonomy, subjective utility, and the consequences of individual
differences in the extent of bounded rationality); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1033 (2012) (arguing that even libertarian paternalism, the least paternalistic theory of
behavioral law and economics, will reduce both welfare and liberty).
50. “Willingness-to-accept” is the lowest price a prospective seller will take; “willingness-topay” is the highest price a prospective buyer will pay.
51. See generally Martin Zelder, The Cost of Accosting Coase: A Reconciliatory Survey of Proofs and
Disproofs of the Coase Theorem, in COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW
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participants, each nonunanimous coalition can be defeated by a different
nonunanimous coalition, and we can face a situation akin to the provision of
a public good. Further, the comparative advantage of bargaining over
legislation disappears. If we require stronger rationality assumptions about
Coasean bargaining, then in order to be consistent we need to make the same
assumptions about legislative bargaining.
Making a trade requires at least two people, but often not more. In the
traditional markets that have dominated classical and neoclassical economics,
the number of people who make a trade is only a small subset of the market’s
total participants. For example, the competitive market for bread contains
thousands of buyers and sellers, but a trade requires only one of each, and the
rest of the market is largely unaffected.
Coasean markets are different because trading requires all participants
to agree.52 Even in the two-person setting, such as Sturges and Bridgman, this
market functions less well than a competitive market because it is a bilateral
monopoly. Each one can trade only with the other.53 As the number of
bargainers necessary to make a trade increases and their individual interests
are more diverse, reaching a bargain becomes much more difficult.54
Coasean bargaining with many players can yield cycling problems,
although they are somewhat different from the cycling problems encountered
in political (majority vote) markets.55 In political markets a common problem
is that a nonunanimous but initially winning coalition can be defeated by a
different nonunanimous coalition, as developed in Condorcet’s Paradox and

INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 65 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998). For further reference, see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 303–04 (1992)
(discussing the assumptions required to prove the Coase Theorem). For equivalent problems in
two-person Coasean markets, or bilateral monopolies, see generally Blair et al., supra note 34.
52. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63, 65 (2011).
53. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 238–47 (1975) (explaining the
numerous difficulties of trading in less than competitive markets).
54. On the relevance of diversity to transaction costs, see generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027
(1995); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997).
55. On cycling problems in Coasean markets, see generally Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L.
Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & ECON. 175 (1981); R.H. Coase, The Coase
Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1981); Hovenkamp, supra note 51.
For more skeptical views, see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
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later formalized by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.56 As a result, purely
democratic markets can be unstable unless the vote is unanimous.57
In the Coasean market a unanimously agreed-upon solution is stable
because it would take another unanimous choice to change it. The cycling
problem shows up in reaching the decision in the first place. Suppose a
factory’s smokestack belches smoke that injures 100 homeowners but is in a
non-nuisance jurisdiction. The homeowners must pay the smokestack if they
want to shut it down. That payment will theoretically occur if the aggregate
value that the homeowners place on freedom from smoke is greater than the
value that the factory places on continued operation in that location. But how
will the payment be divided among the homeowners? A coalition of the most
nearby homeowners may agree on an equal payment for everyone, but more
remote homeowners will object that they are injured less by the smoke and
thus place a lower value on its removal. Or those who have property interests
that are less valuable or less vulnerable to smoke damage will argue that
payments should be proportioned to provable harm. Or some homeowners
may object that the prevailing winds force the smoke into a path that injures
some homeowners more than others. The result could be an endless set of
proposals, coalitions, and counterproposals, with no proposal ever achieving
the unanimous consent that is needed.
The same thing could happen in a nuisance jurisdiction where the value
of operating the factory is greater than the injury to the homeowners. In that
case the factory would be willing to compensate the homeowners, but only
after they agree on how the compensation should be divided. The same
problems emerge. Any proposed agreement could be defeated by an
alternative proposed agreement.
One might be tempted to say that the problem of reaching and
maintaining efficient outcomes in many-player Coasean markets is one of
transaction costs. These costs may become higher, even insurmountable, in
markets that have large numbers of participants and that give rise to the
formation of alternative coalitions. The issue is more complex than that,
however. If bargaining were literally costless, it would go on forever. A rational

56. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (Yale Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1963). On the Theorem’s relation to governance, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s
Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990). On voting cycles in
democratic nonunanimous decision making, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 72–78
(2003).
57. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 38–39 (1991). See generally Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1073 (2010) (discussing cycling in legislative contexts); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988) (discussing cycling in legislative processes). On the
implications of Condorcet’s paradox on democratic institutions, particularly where preferences
are not naked but are arrayed around specific policies or ideologies, see generally WILLIAM V.
GEHRLEIN & DOMINIQUE LEPELLEY, VOTING PARADOXES AND GROUP COHERENCE: THE
CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF VOTING RULES (2011).
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decision maker would continue to bargain as long as the expected value of
improving one’s position exceeded the cost of continuing to bargain, which
would be zero. Under zero-cost bargaining any possibility of an improvement
would yield a further offer. Indeed, in such situations it is more likely that
positive, although manageable, bargaining costs serve to induce equilibrium
by making continued bargaining costly.58
One possible solution to the cycling problem is a damages rule rather
than an injunction rule. For example, suppose that 100 homeowners object
to a smokestack. Their individual damages are diverse but the aggregate is
$1000. The value of operating the smokestack is $1200, so it is willing to pay
the $1000. An injunction rule might yield infinite cycling, but under a
damage rule a third party such as a jury could assess the loss to each
homeowner, who would then be forced to accept that amount in lieu of an
injunction. Coase himself once observed that switching to damage rules in
such cases could prevent cycling.59 The result, however, is to give the
smokestack something akin to the power of eminent domain.60 In any event,
the harm is done, and the damages must be paid only because the
homeowners and the smokestack were permitted to move into such close
proximity in the first place. Prohibiting this could have made both an
injunction and damages unnecessary by preventing the harm altogether.
An additional feature of the damages rule is that in most situations
bargaining or bargaining analogies are no longer part of the solution. For
most injuries damages rules turn into a variation of the “cheapest cost avoider”
problem with respect to automobile accidents61 by substituting engineering
or objective resource movement costs for bargaining. For example, if the
smoke pollution is injuring a downwind homeowner’s roses, the relevant
question becomes the market value of the ruined roses, replacement costs, or
something akin to that. We no longer care about parties’ bargaining strategies
or, in most cases, even their subjective values.
A. THE PUBLIC GOODS CHARACTER OF MANY-PLAYER COASEAN MARKETS
Coase himself recognized the problem of bargaining in markets with
large numbers of players. He was particularly concerned with smoke
pollution, writing about it in both his 1959 article on the Federal
Communications Commission and a year later in The Problem of Social Cost.
One can speculate that his interest resulted from his earlier life in heavily-

58. Coase’s response was that determining what would happen under zero transaction costs
is simply “without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of positive
transaction costs.” Coase, supra note 55, at 187.
59. Id.
60. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2112 (1997) (noting application of a damages rule as one difference between
eminent domain and voluntary transactions).
61. See supra Part III.C.

HOVENKAMP_PP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

640

12/15/2014 3:30 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:617

polluted London. In The Federal Communications Commission, Coase observed
that “[w]hen large numbers of people are involved, the argument for the
institution of property rights is weakened and that for general regulations
becomes stronger.”62 Speaking of smoke pollution in particular, he
acknowledged that “if many people are harmed and there are several sources
of pollution, it is more difficult to reach a satisfactory solution through the
market.”63 As a result, “[i]n these circumstances it may be preferable to
impose special regulations . . . .”64
In The Problem of Social Cost a year later, Coase returned to smoke
pollution.65 Interestingly, his most extensive discussion was of Bryant v. Lefever,
a dispute between a single defendant and a single plaintiff. Coase himself
acknowledged that the situation was “novel.”66 The nuisance dispute arose
when the defendant rebuilt his house, giving it a higher roofline that
prevented the plaintiff’s chimney from clearing its smoke.67 Coase later
addressed “the standard case of a smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast
number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities.”68 Coase conceded
that private bargaining might not be able to determine the result and that we
might wish to call upon the government as a “super-firm” to solve the
problem.69
Coase also discussed the problem of railroad trains that throw sparks
from their engines, sometimes causing fires on nearby land.70 The relevant
cost to the individual landowners is the probability that a fire will occur on
their property multiplied by the expected amount of damage. The relevant
cost to the railroads is the cost of minimizing the sparks, perhaps by
proceeding more slowly or installing spark-suppressing technology or
switching fuels, or perhaps even by ceasing operation or relocating.
A single railroad line might pass by hundreds of landowners, and a deal
with any one of them will not bind the others. Suppose that the cost of
eliminating the sparks is less than the risk-adjusted cost of expected injury to
the landowners. In a well-functioning Coasean market the parties would
bargain to a solution in which the railroad eliminated the sparks by some
means. If the parties are in a nuisance jurisdiction the outcome is fairly simple:
no deal will result. The most the railroad is willing to pay will be less than the

62. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29 (1959).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Coase, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–13.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. The Bryant court used the type of “wrongdoer” analysis that Coase rejected—namely
that while making smoke and injuring a neighbor might be a nuisance, in this case the plaintiff
was being injured by his own smoke. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 17.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 29.
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value the landowners place on being free from the risk imposed by the sparks.
The railroad will have to take whichever avoidance mechanism is effective and
cheapest.
But what if the parties are in a no-nuisance jurisdiction? The landowners
will have to pay off the railroad. We can assume that the gross amount of the
payment is easy to compute because it applies to the railroad alone. For
example, if effective spark-arresting technology costs $1 million, the railroad
would accept any amount in excess of that. But how is the payment to be
divided up among the, say, 1000 landowners adjoining the tracks? First, they
are very likely quite diverse. Some have grazing land adjoining the tracks,
making the expected cost of spark-induced fire relatively small. Others may
have assets that are easily and cheaply moved further from the tracks.71 Others
may have houses or other buildings close by, and for them the expected cost
of a fire will be much greater. Some may have 100 feet of frontage along the
tracks while others have 500 feet, greatly increasing their exposure. Some may
be in a direction that is persistently upwind while others are downwind. Some
may be in areas where trains travel or accelerate much more than in other
areas, and thus emit more sparks.
The result will be either underinvestment in efficient technologies or
activities, or else a great deal of negotiating and cycling through various
alternatives. For example, the landowners may form coalitions whose
members can be siphoned off by alternative coalitions. Small owners might
agree to pay $500 each, leaving large landowners with $5000. But then a
subgroup of the large landowners might reform as a coalition of those having
houses along the tracks, asking others to join them and offering $4000 each.
In such a situation Coasean bargaining under a unanimous-consent rule
can turn into endless cycling with no agreement ever being reached. The story
is a little like Charles Dickens’ Bleak House, where numerous potential heirs
and devisees contested a will, each asking for more than someone else or
trying to exclude others until the entire estate was consumed by litigation
costs.72 The parties would have been much better off if they had been able to
agree, but an agreement would have required unanimous consent among all
of those with a colorable claim.73
Each landowner will have a tendency to understate his exposure, thus
making his share of the payment smaller. In addition, each landowner knows

71. E.g., LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340, 341 (1914)
(discussing how landowner’s injury from railroad sparks was from stacks of straw that were
positioned very close to the track); see also Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior:
Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 37 (1988).
72. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Signet Classics 2003) (1853).
73. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 202–03 (2000); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the
State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 7 (1985) (describing property disputes among multiple
actors in a “state of nature”).
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that once the spark arrester is installed it will benefit everyone, so they may be
able to get away without paying anything at all.74 That is to say, the many-player
Coasean market effectively becomes a market for a public good in the sense
that a costly but efficient fix, once installed, benefits the entire affected
population. The railroad cannot insist on individual payment by selectively
denying protection. At the same time, however, each landowner has an
incentive to understate the value of the interest in question.75
To be sure, the available solutions might be diverse, with some
resembling public goods more than others. For example, the railroad might
accept compensation in order to run more slowly alongside the farms of
payors, even decreasing its speed as they pay more. In that case it might be
able to bargain with each landowner individually. If it installs the sparkarresting technology, however, all landowners will be protected, whether they
pay or not. The first solution may be superior from a bargaining standpoint,
while the second may be superior technologically.
It also does not add much to say that efficient outcomes will emerge when
gainers from a certain rule can compensate the losers, who stand to lose less
than the gainers gain. If actual bargains were at issue, the recipients would
still have to agree with each other about how the compensation is to be
divided, or the payors would have to agree on the size of each person’s
obligation. The same cycling problems re-enter.76
Coase himself recognized the public goods character of some Coasean
markets. In his article The Lighthouse in Economics, he noted a history in which
lighthouses were privately financed with harbor taxes charged against ships
who came and went.77 But Coase never adequately addressed the problem of
ships that simply passed by, benefitting from the lighthouse but not required
to pay the tax. The lighthouses were never really private, and to the extent

74. On whether the problem of nonpayment by free riders is a “transaction cost,” see
HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
THE INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 116–17 (2008) (arguing that the cost of free riders is an
ownership cost rather than a transaction cost).
75. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY
IT MATTERS 49–50 (2000) (discussing the public goods problem in some Coasean markets).
76. But see generally Francesco Parisi, Political Coase Theorem, 115 PUB. CHOICE 1 (2003)
(arguing that Coasean markets with zero transaction costs, single-peaked preferences, and side
payments could yield stable outcomes). In most cases, including the illustrations discussed in the
text, the preferences of individual landowners are not single-peaked because they divide into
different categories that cannot be arrayed along a single line. For example, if the only variable
was each landowner’s distance from a smokestack, the array of preferences might be singlepeaked. But different landowners might also be engaged in different types of activity that is more
or less harmed by smoke, and this array might be uncorrelated with distance from the smokestack.
Another array might be correlated with prevailing wind direction, or the nature of the assets at
risk. The aggregation of these preference sets is not single-peaked. In any event, bargaining
depends on declared willingness to pay or accept, not on objective measurement of cost or profit.
If we use the latter, then we are no longer relying on a bargaining metaphor.
77. R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 360–61 (1974).
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they were, they failed.78 In any event, the harbor tax was assessed by a
government agency or its equivalent.
Bargaining problems in many-player Coasean markets have numerous
real world manifestations. One example is the previously discussed issue of
whether land uses are best allocated legislatively through the zoning system
or else by private bargaining. In the first two decades after The Problem of Social
Cost was published, several writers advocated private restrictive covenants as
efficient alternatives to legislative zoning.79 Pairwise resolution of disputes
among people who have already made their investments is always suboptimal,
however, if the investments themselves are suboptimal and extraction is costly.
If we want maximizing solutions—the kind where both uses can coexist—then
we must identify the problems before the conflict arises. This entails a system
more like the one for traffic rules, which focuses on the entire area in which
resource conflicts arise, on classes of users rather than individuals, and on the
overall costs of moving resources. In general, the more costly it is to move or
redeploy a poorly located resource (such as a smokestack), the greater the
value in getting it right the first time. Zoning and subdivision servitude
decisions typically involve questions such as how far commercial and
noncommercial uses should be separated from one another, whether
polluting or noise producing industry should be segregated, whether to have
separate professional and industrial parks, how to consider commuting costs
in locating residential and commercial areas, and so on. Assuming we can
predict with at least minimal accuracy, the costs of making the right decisions
before investment occurs are almost certain to be significantly lower than the
later costs of extraction from badly made decisions.
B. EXCESSIVE CYCLING OR EXCESSIVE STABILITY?
Even when unanimous consent is initially achieved, Coasean bargaining
rules are suboptimal when they make it more difficult to respond to changed
circumstances. Rules initially established by unanimous consent might later
become inefficient. If unanimous consent is required to change them,
however, there will be holdouts that prevent the change from taking place.
That is, the Coasean market then produces excessive stability, which makes
such rules particularly troublesome in changing markets.

78. See Elodie Bertrand, The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities, 30
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 389, 390 (2006).
79. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 77–84 (1972); Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 681, 711–19 (1973); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise
Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 66 (1981); Robert H. Nelson, Contracting for Land Use
Law: Zoning by Private Contract, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 157, 171–73 (F.
H. Buckley ed., 1999); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning
with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828–29
(1999).
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Excessive stability has proven to be a significant problem in subdivisions
where land uses are governed mainly by restrictive covenants, easements, or
other servitudes. Some residential subdivisions have attempted to solve this
problem by permitting nonunanimous voting to change an existing
restriction that is no longer desirable.80 But switching to nonunanimous rules
simply substitutes one cycling problem for another. The nonunanimous rules
have all the defects of democratic voting systems generally.81 As a result, the
courts have frequently had to intervene to protect minority rights. For
example, several courts have held that even where a set of restrictions permit
changes by less than unanimous voting, unanimity would be required for a
proposed change that would affect only a single lot in the subdivision.82
One alternative approach is to re-conceptualize the problem of multiplayer bargaining as a time series of pairwise contracts. That is what frequently
happens when residential subdivisions are initially developed. The developer
draws up a list of land use restrictions for a particular subdivision, typically by
making an economic prediction concerning the uses that will maximize
subdivision value—a prediction, incidentally, that is based on externally
measured assessments of value rather than actual willingness-to-pay. The
developer then places these restrictions into the chain of title and sells the
homes individually, with each buyer agreeing to the restrictions. Once the
restrictions are in place and buyers have begun to purchase, acceptance of
the restrictions is largely mandatory—take them or leave them. This avoids
the problem of dozens or hundreds of homeowners having to bargain at once.
This “vertical” series of pairwise transactions must eventually turn into a

80. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller’s Landing, L.L.C., 29 So. 3d 228, 235 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)
(concluding that a rule permitting less than unanimous consent to amend a restriction is subject
to a judicially enforced reasonableness test); Brown v. Martin, 794 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2010) (considering a provision permitting amendment of the covenant by less than
unanimous vote in certain circumstances); Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 311
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining the subdivision’s rule that allowed a majority of the residents to
amend a covenant); Lawton v. Schwartz, 308 P.3d 1033, 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (examining
rules that allowed 75% of owners in a community to change the restrictive covenant); Estates at
Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736, 745 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)
(considering the validity of a rule requiring unanimous consent to amend a covenant during the
first 25 years of its creation, but permitting less than unanimous decisions thereafter).
81. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative
Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519 (2002) (arguing that zoning has an advantage over private
bargaining); Neal Kumar Katyal, Stochastic Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990 (2013) (reviewing
JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012));
Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1988) (discussing
the disadvantages of public intervention in servitudes); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of
Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615 (1985) (proposing the
changed conditions doctrine be limited to situations where unanimous consent is required for
modifications).
82. See, e.g., Licker v. Harkleroad, 558 S.E.2d 31, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Walton v.
Jaskiewicz, 563 A.2d 382, 386 (Md. 1989); Maatta v. Dead River Campers, Inc., 689 N.W. 2d 491,
498 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
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“horizontal” arrangement among the homeowners, who eventually take it
over and operate it themselves under contract rules. By that time the
servitudes are already in place.83 It would be as if Sturges and Bridgman had
been obligated before making their purchase (or lease) to agree to a covenant
restricting the use of noisy machinery. If such a covenant had been in place
Bridgman would presumably have decided to go elsewhere, where his
machinery would not interfere with Sturgis’ stethoscope.
However, this approach would not solve the problem of servitudes that
no longer serve their social purpose. We can still expect post-agreement
hyperstability. Restrictions remain enforceable even after they serve to reduce
rather than increase value. For example, if a neighborhood subject to
residence-only restrictions has changed and surrounding areas have gone
commercial, a significant majority may wish to profit by selling off their
property for commercial use. But a small number, perhaps those in the
interior, want to maintain the residential restrictions because they like where
they are living and the surrounding, similarly restricted homeowners provide
a buffer.84 In such cases the courts have sometimes provided relief, but of
course in so doing they are imposing a judicial judgment that conflicts with
the contract-based judgment of the homeowners, and often where there is no
obvious injury to outsiders.85
C. FRACTURED MARKETS AND THE OPTIMAL SOURCE OF REGULATION
Another difference between servitude rules and zoning rules is domain.
Both private restriction systems and legislative systems can be subject to
fracture, but private restrictions are more prone to the problem. The
boundaries of subdivisions or other private residential developments such as
condominiums are often drawn too small to encompass the areas over which
resource conflicts arise. Subdivision boundaries are not only smaller than
municipal boundaries, but they are often a function of nothing more than
previous ownership of a parcel of land. For example, a developer might

83. The developer typically has the power to enforce the servitudes as long as it owns at least
one protected lot in the subdivision; but once it has sold the last lot, it no longer has standing. See
Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Ass’n v. W. Pac. Hous., Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41, 49–50
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that developers lacked standing because they “no longer ha[d] an
interest in the land”). Some cases are less specific, permitting the developer to retain control for a
“reasonable time” to fulfill its marketing efforts. Barclay v. DeVeau, 429 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Mass.
1981).
84. See, e.g., Redfern Lawns Civic Ass’n v. Currie Pontiac Co., 44 N.W.2d 8, 11–12 (Mich.
1950) (refusing to apply the changed conditions doctrine to grant relief from a servitude where
maintenance of a single-family home restriction operated as a buffer benefitting interior lots);
Matthews v. Winstanley, No. 242472, 2003 WL 22976411, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2003)
(refusing to set aside a deed restriction where the character of the neighborhood had changed
substantially).
85. For a critique, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law
of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982).
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acquire the “Smith farm” in order to subdivide it for residential purposes. But
the boundaries of the Smith farm have little to do with prevailing patterns of
air or water movement, traffic, noise, congestion, or any of the other harmful
effects that zoning is designed to address. Further, because servitudes are
contractual, the only people who can enforce them are typically those who
were parties to a contract or an estate in the encumbered land. For example,
a lot owner in the Smith farm subdivision will very likely have standing to
assert the no-smokestack covenant against another lot owner in that same
subdivision, but she will not be able to enforce the restriction against a
landowner across the street who is not part of the subdivision.86
Zoning by small communities can be subject to these problems as well,
but in that case regional or statewide land-use regulation can be stacked above
it so as to encompass larger markets.87 This simply reflects the principle that
the entity imposing a regulation should be geographically large enough to
encompass the entire market that is being regulated. Otherwise we can expect
self-dealing and myopic decision making.88
D. EX ANTE AND EX POST DECISION MAKING: EFFICIENCY AND THE LONG RUN
Using the nuisance case of Sturges v. Bridgman as one illustration, Coase’s
social cost analysis identified the efficient solution as the one where the higher
value activity is preferred while the lower value activity is shut down or perhaps
ameliorated.89 As noted previously, this solution is “efficient” only if we
confine our analysis to the micro-market involving Sturges and Bridgman,
which is often smaller than the markets in which the parties’ activities

86. See, e.g., Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Props. Ltd. P’ship, 862 P.2d 1048, 1063 (Haw.
1993) (holding that a property owner across the street from a height-restricted subdivision could
not enforce the restriction even if he was injured); see also Shaff v. Leyland, 914 A.2d 1240, 1245
(N.H. 2006) (holding that a person who no longer owned property in a subdivision could not
enforce a covenant restricting the number and architectural nature of the subdivision’s homes);
Santa Fe Estates, Inc. v. Concerned Residents of Santa Fe N., Inc., 207 P.3d 1143, 1147 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that a group of interested citizens who were not landowners in the subdivision
could not enforce the subdivision’s restrictions); Stegall v. Hous. Auth. of Charlotte, 178 S.E.2d 824,
829 (N.C. 1971) (holding that a person who did not own a lot in a subdivision could not enforce
the subdivision’s single-family home restriction); Lakewood Racquet Club, Inc. v. Jensen, 232 P.3d
1147, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that once a property had been sold, the previous
owner’s heirs could no longer enforce the covenant).
87. On “stacking” as a fix for institutional fracture, see infra Part VI.
88. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1044–45, 1070 (1988) (discussing the dispute over state versus federal
regulation of the American railroad system). On the fracturing problem in zoning, see generally
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1115 (1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Herbert Hovenkamp & John
A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1985).
89. See supra Part II.
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operate.90 Once we look at the broader market for confectioning, doctoring,
or small business generally, then we may be able to produce solutions in which
both activities can continue without harming one another. In order to do that
we would need to consider all of the costs of moving resources, not merely
those that are involved in transacting. We must also examine the longer run,
because an important part of the cost of moving resources is correcting for
previous mistakes. In most situations the optimal course is to put them into
the correct place to begin with.
Blum and Kalven were correct in 1964 that pairwise bargaining would
not work as between two automobiles facing an impending collision.91
Calabresi responded with a solution that re-focused the automobile accident
question on the entire market in which such collisions likely are to occur.92
Because bargaining is possible between neighbors with stable relationships
and predictable disputes, Coase was able to focus on tiny markets that told us
a great deal about bargaining but said little about optimal allocations of
resources in the greater markets in which these activities occurred. The truly
efficient solution to the Sturges v. Bridgman problem requires broadening our
vision to take into account the entire set of market choices that these two
people faced before they made their investments in a particular location. That
necessarily includes a much larger area that encompasses both of their uses,
as well as a longer period of time. In the process, we will have involved a much
greater number of persons and greater diversity of interests in the negotiating
process.
As between two parties in a resource conflict, the person who places the
greater value on a right after interests are in place is not necessarily the one
who would have valued it most highly before he moved in. For example, our
hypothetical numbers assumed that Sturges’s use of his stethoscope was more
valuable than Bridgman’s use of his mechanical mortar and pestle. However,
looking ex ante it may also be true that relocating Bridgman’s bulky candy
manufacturing equipment is much more costly than relocating Sturges’s
lightweight stethoscope. In addition to assuming that Sturges valued use of
his stethoscope at £100 while Bridgman valued use of his mortar and pestle
at £60, suppose that it would cost Sturges only £25 to relocate while it would
cost Bridgman £40. In that case a more efficient outcome occurs when Sturges
moves and both parties continue their operations. If the jurisdiction finds a
nuisance, Bridgman will have to pay Sturges to move. If there is no nuisance
Sturges must pay his own moving costs. While professionals often have highly
valuable occupations, they also frequently have fairly mobile assets. The cost

90. See Williamson, supra note 53, at 24 (noting the partial equilibrium nature of Coasean
analysis).
91. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 41, at 700.
92. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 135 & n.1.
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of moving a law office might be considerably less than the cost of re-locating
a cement production plant.93
The most efficient solution to the Sturges v. Bridgman problem is to
allocate property rights in such a way that the problem never arises in the first
place. Then we can have both confectioners and physicians. This means that
the initial position must be one from which further movement is least likely
to be necessary. For example, if we can assign Sturges’s right to a place where
he will be free to practice without interference we would have the social value
of his activity, or £100. If we can do the same thing with Bridgman we will also
have the social value of his activity, or £60. Making such decisions, however,
almost always requires looking beyond Sturges and Bridgman. While each
building has only one actual owner, it may have a very large number of
potential owners. One relatively private approach to the problem would be a
set of servitudes that segregated business activities by the amount of
interference that they caused. For example, relatively noisy activities such as
confectioning could be assigned to one land area, while professional activities
such as practicing medicine could be assigned to a different area. This could
only happen in a relatively large subdivision, however. It would thus place us
in territory that involves multi-player negotiating and all of the problems
attending such markets, as discussed above.
At this point subjective bargaining analogies fail us, but there are
alternatives. The Arrovian theory predicting endless cycling in many political,
majority rule markets assumed “naked” voter preferences that were
noncomparable from one actor to another.94 But identification of the
“cheapest cost avoider” in accident law makes no such assumption. Instead of
inferring “preferences,” as bargaining theory does, it looks directly at the
problem of the cost of moving resources, typically focusing on engineering
costs, health costs, productivity, or other factors that can be estimated directly
from market prices without using individual preference as a surrogate. For
example, making cars stop rather than trains is not a matter of assessing the
preferences of drivers and engineers, but rather of doing a cost-benefit
analysis of different assignments of the obligation to stop.
V. MANAGING FRACTURE THROUGH DEFAULT RULES
Default rules can provide a presumptive solution to resource conflicts but
then permit parties in individual settings to select a different arrangement.
They are particularly useful when the “gross” rules for a particular situation
are relatively clear and common, but finer rules require more individualized
decisions. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that title to
goods passes when the goods are delivered, but permits the parties to agree

93. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (using nuisance law to
address cement plant pollution where relocation was costly).
94. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 56.
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to an alternative.95 One defense of such a rule is that it takes the issue of title
passage off the table for the great majority of covered bargains, but permits
parties to bargain around the rule when an alternative increases net value. A
well-designed default rule assigns the right so that it creates the greater value
in most situations (or situations producing the greatest value), making
bargaining unnecessary. It then permits the parties to bargain around the
default whenever the values are switched. Default provisions are particularly
important in situations where the parties must bargain but high transaction
costs, risk aversion, or an endowment effect obstructs trading to a higher
value.96
Because common law rules permit settlements, default rules are
ubiquitous in any regime where private common law governs legal outcomes.
But they can also be valuable in a mixed regime of regulation and private
ordering. In addition, they protect individual autonomy by giving people both
the choice to act as they wish but a certain amount of state control in situations
where the social value of a particular outcome is high but individual costs are
relatively small. That is, they serve to soften the paternalism of more heavy
handed regulation.
Much of the literature on default rules has been concerned with contract
law, and their relevance in contractual situations is obvious. For commercial
contracts in particular, default rules serve to fill in the gaps when contracts
are incomplete. When the gap is explicitly filled in, however, the default gives
way to the parties’ expressed preferences.97 Default rules exist in many other
legal settings, however, quite aside from contract law. Construction of legal
documents, statutes, regulatory choices, and even the Constitution also
involve default rules that apply mainly when language is ambiguous or
incomplete.98 For example, Chief Justice Taney’s famous conclusion in the
Charles River Bridge case that in grants from the government “nothing passes

95. U.C.C. § 2-401 (2012).
96. See generally Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, supra note 31. For
additional discussion, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 613–17 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 106, 110–12 (2002).
97. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
98. See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION (2008); Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 396, 429 (2009) (arguing that applying default rules in contracts is a distributive task); Bubb
& Pildes, supra note 49, at 1628–30 (considering default rules in the context of retirement
programs); Gillian E. Metzger, Congressional Authority and Constitutional Default Rules in the
Horizontal Federalism Context, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC
INTEREST ADVOCACY 101 (Kathleen Claussen et al., eds., 2008), available at http://www.law.
yale.edu/why_the_local_matters_final_122109.pdf; Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch,
Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127
(2014); Tara Mikkilineni, Note, Constitutional Default Rules and Interbranch Cooperation, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1403 (2007).
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by implication,” writes a default rule into the Constitution’s Contract Clause:
a grant of land or a franchise from the state does not include a monopoly
right unless the granting language does so explicitly.99
The Coase Theorem assumes default rules to the extent that common
law rules create alienable entitlements.100 The invariance thesis states that in
a zero transaction-cost world assignment of the default does not matter.101 For
example, whether or not Bridgman’s mortar and pestle is declared a nuisance,
the parties will bargain to the more efficient result. Default rules can matter,
however, when the costs of bargaining are greater than the bargaining space,
or the different valuations placed by the two parties. For example, if Sturges
values the right to be free from Bridgeman’s thumping by £100 while
Bridgman values use of the machine at £60, the parties may not be able to
agree on the efficient result if transaction costs exceed £40.
Traditional command-and-control regulation takes market choices away
from individuals. Assuming that the regulation is well designed, this removal
of market choice can be justified by generalizations from large numbers. For
example, the rationale for a regulation that forbids anyone from conducting
a business in a suburban area zoned R-1, or residential-only, is that the
affected group as a whole is better off. Further, the statute accomplishes this
much more efficiently than large numbers of conflict resolutions among
disputing neighbors, particularly when we include the costs of extraction from
previous mistakes.102 Default rules may also be inappropriate when the
purpose of the regulation is to protect someone from the market itself. For
example, suppose the minimum wage were a default rule. By default people
must be paid at least $7.50 per hour, unless they agree to a lower amount.
The effect could be the same as if there were no minimum wage statute at all.
While legislation typically operates at a macro level, affecting large
numbers of people, default rules often operate at a “micro” level. For
example, the default rules developed in the Uniform Commercial Code apply
to a very large number of commercial contracts. Deviating from them,
however, typically requires an agreement between a single seller and a single
buyer.
Default rules look less like “default” rules and more like absolute rules as
the costs of defaulting increase. These costs can be either transactional or
nontransactional. For example, once the smokestack and the homeowners are
in place, a default rule declaring that the smokestack is not a nuisance may be
absolute to the extent that (1) reaching an agreement among the multiple
parties is costly; or (2) relocating the smokestack is costly. The first is a cost of
99. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
420, 546 (1837); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at
110–14 (1991).
100. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
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transacting; the second is simply a cost of relocating a heavy and specialized
installation that was built in the wrong place.
A. DEFAULT RULES FOR DIFFERENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
The idea of default rules is that in appropriate circumstances people can
bargain around them.103 When markets are unimportant, however, because
resources are being allocated in some other way, default rules may be
unimportant as well.
The theory of private default rules has not done an adequate job of
differentiating their use in different institutional settings. A complete theory
of private default rules must address three distinct issues. First, how should
the legal policy maker select a default rule? Second, when should the rule be
default and when should it be absolute? Third, what kind of bargaining
coalition is needed to reverse the default?
1. The Selection of a Default Rule
The proper default rule should reflect a reality that occurs in the great
majority of cases, or that produces the greatest value, but where socially
valuable deviations are likely to occur when people intentionally deviate from
the default. One good candidate is to place liability on the “cheapest cost
avoider.” That rule does a reasonably good job of predicting who would have
won the entitlement in a well-functioning market. To the extent that common
technologies have similar costs, rules that place liability on the “cheapest cost
avoider” should increase social value most of the time. Another good
candidate is “first in time is first in right,” or the rule that priority of possession
determines title. Another is that during the period after a land sale contract
has been executed but before delivery of the deed the risk of loss is on the
party in possession.104
A good default rule also should be able to reduce bad outcomes when
transaction costs are sufficiently high that the parties would not be able to
negotiate around the default. But a good default rule also reduces the
deadweight loss of transaction costs even when the parties could bargain to
an efficient alternative. For example, if Sturges values the right to be free of
Bridgman’s noise by £100 while Bridgman values the right to make it by £60,
the parties might be able to negotiate to the efficient result even if the law
improperly assigned the right to Bridgman, provided that transaction costs
are less than £40. For example, executing a real covenant forbidding
103. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1175 (2003); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT 101–04 (2013); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 85–87 (Penguin Books rev. ed. 2009)
(2008); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J.
1826, 1882 (2013).
104. See infra text accompanying note 117.
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Bridgman from operating his mortar and pestle might cost only £35. But that
£35 is a pure deadweight loss if the law could accomplish that result ex ante
and at no cost. Here, as in other areas, getting it right the first time saves
resources.
Even when transaction costs are very low, default rules might serve to
address behavioral issues, including inertia and limitations on perspective.
One of the insights of behavioral economics in this area is that, while
transaction costs certainly impose inertia, they are not the only source of
inertia. The question is, how should this affect policy? Any cost of movement
is a “cost,” whether or not it involves a transaction.105 Often no more than a
very small cost is necessary to deter a person from changing her position. The
problem with many common law approaches to conflict is that their after-thefact nature induces people to make conflict-producing choices first and
extract themselves later. Extraction is less likely as the costs, whether
transactional or otherwise, become higher.
The writing on behavioral economics observes that certain forms of
inertia cannot be explained by “transaction costs.” For example, when
employers adopt “opt out” rather than “opt in” rules for retirement plans,
participation rates are significantly higher even though transaction costs are
low.106 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler give the example of the cafeteria
that puts the dessert in a more remote place than the vegetables.107 This “soft
paternalism” may in fact induce people to consume more vegetables and less
dessert. We can assume that “transaction” costs are zero because nothing is
being transacted, but the choice nevertheless imposes other types of costs, just
as when the grocery store places staples such as milk and bread in the back,
making customers walk through the high margin snacks and sweets. These
costs typically have nothing to do with markets. Rather they are embedded in
the human psyche, instincts, perceptions or other limitations.
Decisions that are given effect “internally” can be just as costly as
decisions that are made on a market—a point that Coase illustrated in The
Nature of the Firm.108 Behavioral economics often has much less to do with
human evolution or irrationality than with the fact that even completely
nontransactional behavior imposes a cost. The hard thing is making sense of
preferences that are never exercised on a market.
When we want a certain outcome it may not matter all that much what
the source of a cost really is. Opt-in versus opt-out rules for retirement plans
is a good example. The employer presumably puts some resources into
determining a plan that is best for its own employees as a general matter,

105. See supra Part II.
106. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 49, at 1609.
107. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 103, at 1166.
108. Coase, supra note 10, at 394–96. See generally Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition,
39 ECON. J. 41 (1929).
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assesses the presumptive contribution, but then gives employees the
opportunity to opt out. At that point, it may not matter so much whether the
choice to stay with the default is a consequence of transaction costs, costs of
movement, or some “irrational” behavioral characteristic such as inertia.
As noted above, default rules are intended for situations where we can
identify the high-value user, or the person who would have won a hypothetical
bargain, on a “class” basis. One possible approach is to consider what most of
the relevant parties would want or what they would want most of the time. For
example, the employer might ask employees to vote on whether they want
money withheld for a retirement plan by default. If the majority votes yes, then
withholding will be presumptive but employees will still be able to opt out
individually. Majoritarian default rules in contract settings operate in this
way.109
If our goal is to maximize value, however, the majoritarian approach can
give the wrong result if parties’ individual valuations are unequal. Consider
the example of the non-default grade crossing rule, which gives trains the
right of way. Undoubtedly many more cars than trains drive through railroad
grade crossings. Simply taking a vote among automobile drivers and train
operators would give the right of way to cars. By contrast, the “cheapest cost
avoider” approach weighs cars and trains differently by focusing on the cost
of stopping rather than the number of vehicles that must be stopped. In other
cases, where the opposing interests are randomized or more equally weighted,
majoritarian default rules may be an efficient way of allocating initial
assignments. For example, if the interests of buyers and sellers are more or
less equally weighty, then the majority rule linking risk of loss to passage of
title is much more likely to be the appropriate default.
As a class, it costs more to stop trains than to stop individual cars,110 but
there can be exceptions. Perhaps a particular train has only two cars and is
travelling empty, while 60 automobiles are approaching the track from two
different directions. Or one of the vehicles might be an ambulance with a
patient in need of emergency care. In such cases it might be much cheaper to
stop the train than the cars. But the transaction costs of identifying these
situations in time and reversing the rule would be very high. Busy grade
crossings typically have warning signals and even gates that descend to block
automobiles, but this technology is unable to choose who gets the right of way
by assessing the comparative cost of stopping. Traffic lights with inductive
loop detectors do a highly simplified version of this, parsing out green or red
lights depending on where the device detects traffic. In general, however,
their ability to do this is limited to the “binary” situation where the cost of
109. For differing views of the nature and merits of majoritarian default rules, see generally
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999);
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541
(2003).
110. See supra Part III.C.
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stopping from one side is zero, because it does not detect any cars in that
lane.111
In other situations “class” identification of the “cheapest cost avoider” is
even less likely and individual analysis is needed. For example, in Sturges v.
Bridgman it is easy to say that if we want to avoid bargaining costs we should
assign the interest to the person who values it most. But this requires a
particularized evaluation of each party’s situation. This explains why the
common law of nuisance has always been fairly nontheoretical and fact
specific.112 We can chop off a few uses at one end of the spectrum as clearly
nuisances “per se,” and some at the other end as clearly non-nuisances. But
most cases in the middle require individual analysis, which we usually
accomplish by balancing either utilities or values through negotiation or
litigation.113
The Restatement of Torts has incorporated a version of this approach since
it was first published in 1939, making a nontrespassory activity that injures
another’s land a nuisance “unless the utility of the actor’s conduct outweighs
the gravity of the harm.”114 Such an approach, which reflected the influence
of the marginalist revolution in legal thought at the time,115 hardly eliminates
the need for individualized analysis and often requires costly, case-specific fact
finding.
2. Choosing Between Default and Absolute Rules
The second consideration is determining when a legal rule should be a
default and when it should be absolute. “Cheapest cost avoider” rules come
in both kinds. The rule that trains have the right-of-way over cars at grade
crossings assigns the duty to the “cheapest cost avoider.” That rule does not

111. On inductive-loop technology, see 1 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
TRAFFIC DETECTOR HANDBOOK ch. 2 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
publications/research/operations/its/06108/06108.pdf. In addition, some emergency vehicles
have the capacity to control traffic lights remotely. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., TRAFFIC SIGNAL PREEMPTION FOR EMERGENCY VEHICLES: A CROSS-CUTTING STUDY 2-1
(2006), available at http://www.gtt.com/wp-content/uploads/Traffic-signal-preemption-foremergency-vehicles-A-cross-cutting-study.pdf.
112. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 123–59 (2015).
113. A doctrine of “nuisance per se” brands a few activities as nuisances without balancing
utilities and harm. E.g., Koeber v. Apex-Albuq. Phoenix Express, 380 P.2d 14, 15–16 (N.M. 1963)
(distinguishing “nuisances in fact” from “nuisances per se” (quoting Denney v. United States, 185
F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). At common law, even fairly
noxious activities were not a declared nuisance per se. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ossola, 199 A. 648, 651
(Conn. 1938) (noting that storage of dynamite “does not constitute a nuisance per se”).
114. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 826 (1939); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 826 (1979) (restating the Restatement (First)’s rule that a nuisance exists only if “the gravity of
the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 cmt. c (2010) (same).
115. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 123–59.
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ordinarily contemplate that the parties can bargain around it. Indeed, you
can get a citation for running a stop sign even if there is no traffic on the cross
street.116 By contrast, a “cheapest cost avoider” default rule emerged in the
late 19th century to govern risk of loss when real property is destroyed after a
contract of sale had been executed but before the title was transferred. A
strong economic case can be made that the risk of loss should travel with the
party in possession, because that person is in the best position to avoid or
minimize the loss. Indeed, a party not in legal possession may be powerless to
minimize certain types of losses, such as risk of fire caused by activities inside
the building. The nonpossessor has no right of entry.117 At the same time,
however, there is no good reason why the parties should not be able to
negotiate a different date for placing the risk of loss, assuming that there is
no coercion and that defrauding of insurers, mortgagees, or other third
parties is not involved.
Absolute rules are necessary when the social costs of the wrong outcome
are high and we cannot trust participants to reach the correct outcome on
their own, or else when permitting them to bargain itself imposes significant
social risk. For example, we could make the rule that cars yield to trains or
that automobiles drive on the right side of the road a mere default rule,
permitting participants to bargain for the alternative in specific cases. But the
social gains from moving to a default rule are likely to be small, and there
would be a certain number of miscommunications with perhaps fatal results.
3. Minimum Coalition to Reverse a Default
The third consideration is the minimum coalition needed to deviate
from the default. The minimum coalition depends on the market type. The
paradigm examples of private default rules involve pairwise relationships
where no one else is affected, such as an agreement between a buyer and seller
on the date title will pass, or the risk of loss rule in real estate sales. In a
traditional competitive market transaction costs can be quite low, particularly
if the good or service being traded is relatively fungible. The purpose of
default rules in such markets is to facilitate mass transactions, such as through
the use of form contracts. As products are more costly, more complex, or
more differentiated the correct default may be more difficult to assign.
However, to the extent only the buyer and seller are affected no greater
coalition is needed to reverse the default, even though the market as a whole
contains thousands of players.

116. E.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1204 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1172 (McKinney 2012).
117. Samuel Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9
HARV. L. REV. 106, 122 (1895) (explaining that “it is wiser to have the party in possession of
property care for it at his peril, rather than at the peril of another”); see also UNIF. VENDOR AND
PURCHASER RISK ACT § 1 (1935).
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In multi-party Coasean markets, by contrast, several people are affected
by an outcome, and the minimum default coalition must typically be as large
as the minimum bargaining coalition. For example, a covenant forbidding
commercial uses in a ten-lot subdivision expresses a default rule. Because the
covenant is contractual the owners can agree later to deviate from it. This does
not mean, however, that one owner can give one neighbor the right to build
a gasoline station; rather, agreeing around the default requires the
unanimous consent of all ten owners. That is, ordinarily the same coalition
that created the rule in the first place is needed to change it.118
B. DEFAULT RULES IN TRADITIONAL MARKETS: COMMERCIAL VS. NONCOMMERCIAL
Default rules are often used in traditional markets, where only two people
are needed to make a trade and other parties are largely unaffected. An
example is the widespread use of default rules in commercial contracts.119
Default rules can be used to fill “gaps” in otherwise incomplete contracts,
while permitting the parties to bargain around the rule in specific cases. The
result is to reduce the cost of high-volume contracting.120 For example, in
many markets deals are facilitated by form contracts that permit the parties to
“redline” specific provisions in order to deviate from the form by
agreement.121
Contract default rules grew up mainly in the law of commercial contracts,
and it is easy to see why.122 By relatively early in the 20th century, marginalist
economists had developed the theory of business firm profit-maximization,
which provided some objective criteria for predicting a firm’s best course of
action. For example, the “hedonical calculus” developed by Jeremy Bentham
was used by the late 19th-century marginalist F.Y. Edgeworth to predict
bargaining behavior from assumptions about individual maximization.123
That methodology ended up working better for business firms than for
individuals, because business firms have profit functions that can often be
specified, at least roughly, by an outside observer using objective tests.124
Profit-maximization is a useful criterion for identifying default rules
because it need not rely on state of mind or incommensurable utility
preferences. It is also a way of escaping the complicating features of
behaviorism in market economics. The “cheapest cost avoider” in Calabresi’s

118. See supra note 80.
119. On default rules in the Uniform Commercial Code, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1992).
120. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 97, at 108–11.
121. See, e.g., Kimaco, LLC v. Wright Dev. W. Coast, LLC, No. 66435-1-I, 2012 WL 556034,
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012) (citing attorney edits and redlines of a form contract for
commercial construction as evidence that the parties actually consented to the contract’s terms).
122. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 123–59.
123. See generally F.Y. Edgeworth, The Hedonical Calculus, 4 MIND 394 (1879).
124. See generally Wesley C. Mitchell, Bentham’s Felicific Calculus, 33 POL. SCI. Q. 161 (1918).
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theory of accidents works in this fashion.125 We do not really care what the
train engineer and the automobile driver are thinking, how much they would
actually be willing to pay, what their bargaining strategies are, or their
different and perhaps idiosyncratic attitudes toward risk. We merely need to
know the engineering cost of stopping and restarting each vehicle. Even
though the traffic at a grade crossing may include both commercial and
noncommercial vehicles, in this case we are not particularly worried about
idiosyncratic utility preferences. We assume that both sides want to avoid the
accident and that the cost of stopping and restarting is the most important
factor in assigning the obligation to stop. These results are admittedly
external to state of mind and, to that extent, normative: they force behavior
without regard to individually asserted preferences.
Workable default rules for purely personal contracts are more difficult to
develop because individuals maximize utility rather than profit, and utility is
difficult or impossible to observe objectively. In addition, biological
individuals, as opposed to firms, evaluate risk and process information
differently. As a result it is more difficult to “fill in the gaps” in a putative
agreement to, say, have sex or to marry. We rightfully insist on relatively
complete manifestations of both consent and the content of the agreement.
As outcomes are based more on idiosyncratic behavioral characteristics rather
than objectively determined assessments of value, default rules are less useful
as gap fillers.
C. DEFAULT RULES FOR COASEAN MARKETS
The more costly the bargaining process, the more important it is to assign
a default rule correctly. If they are to be used at all, the selection of the correct
default rule is more critical in Coasean markets than in traditional markets
because Coasean markets generally function less well. The two-person
Coasean market is a bilateral monopoly, in which bargaining is often thought
to be difficult. Nevertheless, the common law properly permits the parties to
change the default by mutual agreement, provided third parties are not
injured. Indeed, this is what the basic Coasean story is all about. If the
common law default rule is that Bridgman’s mortar and pestle is not a
nuisance, then Sturges might nevertheless pay Bridgman to shut it down.
The optimal default rule in such cases will assign the right to the person
who places the highest value on it. That will make bargaining unnecessary to
create the right outcome in situations where high transaction costs threaten
to prevent the bargain from occurring. As noted earlier, application of this
principle may be difficult in certain situations, such as the law of nuisance,
because identifying the person who places the higher value on the right often
requires case specific analysis.

125.

See supra Part III.C.
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Coasean markets also require unanimous consent to move a resource. As
Coasean markets expand beyond two persons the costs of bargaining around
the default can rise appreciably, and setting the correct default thus becomes
increasingly important.126 Unfortunately, default rules also work less well in
Coasean markets that have large numbers of players. Two-party agreements
around the default will not work. For example, a jurisdiction might create a
default rule that a factory smokestack in a residential area is a nuisance. In
that case the smokestack cannot negotiate with a single landowner for a waiver
from the rule because all the other injured landowners would still have the
right to object.127
VI. “STACKING” LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TO MINIMIZE FRACTURE: “ONE WAY”
DEFAULTS
Zoning laws typically are not default rules. They create rights and
obligations that cannot readily be bargained away. For example, the zoning
law might prohibit operation of the smokestack in a residential
neighborhood. If that rule were simply a default, then the smokestack could
bribe all affected landowners for the right to operate.
But zoning laws do typically create asymmetrical, or “one way” defaults.
They forbid bargaining over the activities they prohibit, but not over the
activities they permit. This permits the zoning regime and private bargaining
to be “stacked” in socially useful ways. Assume, for example, that Bridgman’s
mortar and pestle is not unlawful under the zoning laws. Sturges could still
pay Bridgman to shut it down. That is, the zoning statute might prohibit the
confectioning business in a certain area, but it is not likely to require the land
owner to engage in that business.
Macro- and micro-rules for legal institutions can sometimes be stacked so
as to permit making initial, or “baseline,” resource allocations efficiently,
while letting private decision making apply ad hoc corrections in one
direction. For example, under-deterrent zoning rules may be a good idea, as
long as more restrictive alternatives can be bargained in. The zoning law
would prohibit those uses that are highly likely to be inefficient in a given area
and for which a large number of people have something at stake, but permit
others that are subject to case specific bargaining, particularly where only a
small number of people are affected. The bargaining regime occurs on top of
the regulatory regime.
The system that we have for land use has largely evolved into one such as
this, using zoning rules to establish baseline use standards but then permitting
privately negotiated servitudes to impose stricter standards. For example,

126. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
127. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV.
685, 691–92 (2009) (complaining that various rules designed to limit corporate takeovers are
not default rules, assuming that shareholders could effectively agree to negotiate around them).
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zoning rules might keep smokestacks out of residential communities, on the
theory that separating them from the beginning is the most efficient solution.
No amount of private bargaining (other than obtaining a legislative zoning
amendment) can overturn that result. This result is typically good because
negotiating around such a rule would require unanimous consent of all
affected parties, so the cost of making the right decision initially is far lower
than the cost of mistakes and subsequent extraction. The premise, of course,
is that segregating smokestacks from houses is rarely a mistake that needs to
be corrected later. One could say the same thing about railroads in close
proximity to residences.128
But the zoning regime ordinarily does permit more intrusive private
restrictive covenants that can be individualized over smaller groups of
decision makers. These covenants manage at a more micro-level, extending
to things such as more specific uses, types of building materials, pet
ownership, landscaping, or outbuildings.129 The grosser zoning regulations
ensure that people almost always get their assets located in the right place
from the beginning, thus minimizing the costs of subsequent movement. But
the “finer” servitude regulation permits more nuanced judgments, typically
involving smaller groups of landowners, and typically in situations where the
grosser judgments are much more difficult to make or likely to be mistaken.
In addition to servitudes, the variance or special exception system in
zoning ordinances creates a limited default rule with a relatively high burden.
Zoning might separate industrial from residential uses but then give
individual owners relief from proven mistakes that render the government’s
initial decision suboptimal. The Supreme Court’s first forced “variance”
decision, Nectow v. Cambridge, is a good example. The City of Cambridge
mistakenly zoned Nectow’s land residential, even though it was completely
surrounded by an automobile assembly plant, a soap factory, and railroad
tracks, making the property worthless for residential purposes. The Court

128. E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (invalidating on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds the application of a zoning ordinance that made petitioner’s
property worthless).
129. See, e.g., Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser, 565 P.2d 207, 211 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977) (upholding a covenant prohibiting fences); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n,
878 P.2d 1275, 1292 (Cal. 1994) (in bank) (upholding a covenant restricting pet ownership);
Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1969) (en banc) (upholding a
subdivision architectural committee’s decision to prohibit a certain style of home); Wilshire
Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding
covenant against pet ownership); Woodward v. Cutrer, 838 So. 2d 180, 185 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(upholding covenant prohibiting piers or boathouses); Heston v. Ousler, 398 A.2d 536, 539–40
(N.H. 1979) (upholding a restriction against docks and outbuildings); Syrian Antiochian
Orthodox Archdiocese of N.Y. & All N. Am. v. Palisades Assocs., 264 A.2d 257, 262 (N.J. 1970)
(upholding an architectural committee’s decision to prevent a certain building from being
erected).
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declared this application of the statute unconstitutional, thus forcing
municipalities to provide administrative relief from such errors.130
Under modern law the resolution of the Sturges v. Bridgman nuisance
dispute could come about by either zoning legislation or private agreement.
Both parties were operating businesses, so a simple zoning rule segregating
business and nonbusiness uses would not prevent them from moving into the
same building. A more refined zoning ordinance that classified types of
business might have done so, but such refinement would very likely increase
the likelihood, and thus the social cost, of initial regulatory mistakes. So a
zoning classification system might permit a confectionary and a physician’s
office to operate in close proximity, perhaps under a classification such as
“mixed use,” “commercial,” or “retail and professional.” These classifications
generally permit non-polluting and relatively non-invasive businesses to be
located on adjoining properties. Beyond that, however, developers or
adjoining landowners could negotiate servitudes or similar private
agreements that would provide additional limitations on a contractually
negotiated basis.131 Failing that, of course, they could use the law of nuisance
and the court system.132 A well-designed system of this sort would minimize
the sum of the cost of initial mistakes and forced movement, as well as
subsequent bargaining.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE DESIGN OF MARKETS
We do not usually expect highway drivers to bargain over the right-of-way.
By the time the bargaining relationship is set up, it is too late because
extraction is too costly. People bargain in markets, but the market for optimal
rules about rights-of-way does not consist of a single pair of drivers
confronting each other at the danger point. Rather, it includes all those
driving on a jurisdiction’s roads who are in a position to have a resource
conflict with one another. The “cheapest cost avoider” solution is not a
bargaining solution at all, but one driven by engineering or safety concerns,
130. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188–89; see Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and
Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 345 (2002) (“To
withstand constitutional scrutiny a zoning regulation must yield a legitimate public benefit
without unduly burdening any individual citizen.”).
131. E.g., Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Meridian Hills v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ind. 1961)
(finding that the city could not constitutionally exclude a church from an area zoned primarily
residential); Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I. 2004) (holding
that although the zoning ordinance permitted daycare facilities on residential property,
petitioner was not precluded from enforcing a restrictive covenant that prohibited them).
132. E.g., Beam v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2179-S, 2006 WL 2588991, at *4
(Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2006) (holding that noisy air compressors on the roof of a grocery store lawfully
built in a commercial zone was not a common law nuisance); A to Z Paper Co., Inc. v. Carlo Ditta,
Inc., 775 So. 2d 42, 47–49 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a concrete batching facility lawfully
built in a “mixed use” zoning classification was not a nuisance); Karpiak v. Russo, 676 A.2d 270,
271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that a landscaping business lawfully operated in a commercial
zone was not a nuisance under the Restatement (Second) nuisance rule adopted by the court).
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or else it is simply a convention that must be consistent over a larger number
of transactions. For example, driving on the right may not be inherently safer
than driving on the left, but a uniform rule for either side is certainly safer
than permitting drivers to negotiate with one another on a pairwise basis as
they are approaching.
Are markets involving more established pairwise relationships any
different? Coase thought so because he accepted previously locked-in
commitments as his starting point. Once neighbors have invested in their
current locations, a bargaining analogy is helpful because it helps determine
which is the least harmful among the alternatives available at that point. But
a superior solution may be an ex ante rule that forbids them from locating in
close proximity in the first place. Coase underestimated both the value of that
consideration and the number of times that the State would have to be
involved in making it.
A well-designed system for allocating resources necessarily involves the
heavy use of markets, but markets must be properly designed. Coase’s
suggestion that the legal system would be unimportant but for transaction
costs133 could literally apply only to a social contract formed during some
initial position when people had made no resource commitments whatsoever.
As soon as the first investment is made, however, all bets are off. From that
point the movement of resources can be costly with or without transactions,
and a well-designed legal system must minimize the costs of movement by
both transactional and nontransactional means. To be sure, while bargaining
over the price of moving a smokestack might be costless and perfect, someone
still has to tear the smokestack down and rebuild it in a different place.

133.

See Coase, supra note 1, at 16.

